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The ISTC programme: time for an overhaul
Since 2000, the Department of Health has 
had an explicit policy of using NHS funds 
to contract out some elective surgery and 
associated clinical services to the private for 
profit sector. This policy of commercialisa-
tion is known in England as the Independent 
Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) programme, 
under which the government intends that 
the private health care industry will provide 
elective surgery and other clinical services 
at a projected total cost to the NHS of over 
£5bn ($7.3bn, €5.6bn).1 To date the gov-
ernment has contracted for £2.7bn worth 
of services.2 The core objectives of the pro-
gramme are to assist the NHS in reducing 
waiting times, support the shift from primary 
to secondary care, expand the options for 
patient choice in the provision of services, 
promote innovation, and build relationships 
between the NHS and the private sector.3
The policy has been extraordinarily 
difficult to evaluate because few data are 
publicly available.4 Parliamentary and aca-
demic assessments of the value for money 
and effectiveness of the policy have been 
hindered by the refusal of the Department 
of Health to make the contracts public on 
the grounds of commercial confidential-
ity.1 Because crucial data have not been 
submitted by the private sector to Hospital 
Episode Statistics, quality and performance 
also remain unevaluated.5 6 In July 2006 
the House of Commons Health Committee 
concluded that lack of data made an assess-
ment of the programme impossible, and in 
July 2007 the Healthcare Commission could 
not report on quality of care because ISTCs 
failed to return and comply with Hospital 
Episode Statistics data requirements, a situ-
ation that continues.1 5 6 The programme 
remains highly controversial amid concerns 
that the centres are destabilising NHS trusts, 
forcing service closures, and undermining 
quality of care.1
After an appeal under the Freedom of 
Information Act in Scotland, NHS Tayside 
has placed the only Scottish ISTC contract in 
the public domain. Information that remains 
shrouded in secrecy in England is now pub-
licly available in Scotland, providing the first 
opportunity to assess performance against 
the claims made for the policy.
The Scottish ISTC—background
In November 2006, NHS Tayside Health 
Board contracted Amicus Healthcare (Scot-
land), a subsidiary of Netcare (UK), which 
is a subsidiary of the South African health-
care company Netcare, to provide elective 
procedures over three years for up to 8000 
NHS patients at a cost of £18.7m.7 8 The 
annual contract comprises £5.67m for refer-
rals for operations; £427 000 for referrals 
for outpatient appointments; and £144 000 
for unspecified additional activity.8 A further 
supplement of £80 000 was provided by the 
Scottish government for patients’ travel and 
accommodation.9
Netcare operates from an NHS hospi-
tal; the shared operating theatre is used 
by the NHS during weekdays and by Net-
care at evenings and weekends.8 The Scot-
tish Regional Treatment Centre has been 
accepting referrals since December 2006 
and patients have been undergoing treat-
ment since February 2007.10 Netcare is also 
involved in the first two phases, described 
Is the private sector better 
value for money than the NHS? 
A Scottish case study
The value for money of work contracted out to independent  
sector treatment centres has been hard to assess.  
Allyson Pollock and Graham Kirkwood look at data  
from the only such centre in Scotland
Table 1 | Comparison of annual contract referral and cost specification for Scottish Regional Treatment Centre 
with data from PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 10 month review and data reported to Information Services Division*
Activity  
group
Annual number  
of referrals  
contracted for
Referrals according 
to PWC report, 1 Dec 
2006 to 30 Sep 2007†
Procedures done 1 Dec 
2006 to 30 Sep 2007 
and reported to ISD
Procedures done 1 Dec 
2006 to 31 Dec 2007 
and reported to ISD
Joint replacement‡ 542 NA 3 (1) 35 (6)
Minor orthopaedics§ 303 NA 148 (49) 229 (76)
General surgery 1,110 NA 75 (7) 123 (11)
ENT 144 NA 59 (41) 122 (85)
Plastic surgery§ 113 NA 80 (71) 101 (89)
Urology 412 NA 98 (24) 145 (35)
Not in contract Not applicable NA 35 76
Total volume 2624 2200 (84) 498 (19) 831 (32)
Total value £5 667 464 £2 642 000 (47) £533 213 (9)|| £1 035 603 (18)||
Percentages of annual contract volume and value in brackets. PwC=PricewaterhouseCoopers; ISD=Information Services Division; 
NA=not available.
*Not including outpatient assessments or unspecified additional activity from the contract.
†Fife, Grampian, and Tayside health boards only (there were only four treatments from other health boards to 31 Dec 2007 worth 
£4908).
‡ Healthcare Resource Group codes H80 and H81 were used instead of H02, which had been coded incorrectly in original contract 
(personal communication with NHS Tayside Scottish Regional Treatment Centre contract manager, 2008).
§All H13s counted as minor orthopaedics; there were no plastic surgery H13s (personal communication with NHS Tayside Scottish 
Regional Treatment Centre contract manager, 2008).
||Our estimated figure based on Healthcare Resource Group tariffs set out in the contract. We did not cost treatments that were “not 
in contract”.
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by the Department of Health as wave one 
and phase two, of the ISTC programme in 
England (list of wave one and phase two 
ISTC contracts for England supplied by 
Information Centre for Health and Social 
Care, Oct 2008; available on request). 
In August 2005 the management con-
sultants PricewaterhouseCoopers were 
contracted by the Scottish government to 
provide “…Financial, Commercial & Con-
tractual Advice to the Scottish Treatment 
Centre Pilot Project” at a cost of over half 
a million pounds. In June 2008 they pub-
lished a 10 month evaluation concluding 
that the Scottish Regional Treatment Cen-
tre represented 11% better value for money 
than NHS hospitals, findings described by 
the finance director for NHS Tayside as 
appearing to show “…the private sector can 
provide just as good, if not better, care than 
the NHS but at a significantly lower cost.”9 11 
We explored the basis of this claim.
How did the Scottish ISTC perform against 
the contract?
The first problem we encountered was that 
neither the contract nor Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers’ evaluation conformed to official 
standards for reporting data to the Infor-
mation Services Division of NHS National 
Services Scotland, the agency responsible 
for producing national health statistics in 
Scotland.
The contract bases payment for activity on 
referral data and not actual treatments under-
taken. The PricewaterhouseCoopers evalu-
ation was undertaken on the same basis. To 
establish how many referrals resulted in 
treatment we asked the Information Serv-
ices Division in August 2008 to extract data 
on all treatments reported to them by the 
Scottish Regional Treatment Centre from 
1 December 2006 to 31 December 2007 
by health board of residence, type of pro-
cedure, and month of treatment (known as 
Scottish Morbidity Record SMR01 data) for 
inpatient and day case episodes. We used the 
Healthcare Resource Group tariffs published 
in the contract to derive the actual cost of 
treatments reported to the Information 
Services Division. We then compared the 
referral and cost data in the contract and the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers evaluation with the 
Information Services Division’s treatment 
data for the 10 months from 1 December 
2006 to 30 September 2007 and 13 months 
from 1 December 2006  to 31 December 
2007, to allow for the 12 week maximum 
referral-to-treatment time outlined in the 
contract.8 9
As the table shows, the annual contract 
is for 2624 referrals at a total value of 
£5 667 464. The PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers evaluation for 1 December 2006 to 30 
September 2007 shows that the Scottish 
Regional Treatment Centre received about 
2200 referrals at a cost of £2 642  000. How-
ever, the evaluation does not show which 
procedures patients were being referred 
for or how the total cost was derived. The 
Information Services Division data show 
that over the same period the centre under-
took 498 procedures: 19% of the volume of 
referrals it was contracted to handle annu-
ally. By the end of September 2007, the 
actual value of work done by the centre 
was £533 213. Thirteen months into the 
contract the Information Services Division 
data show that only 831 procedures—32% 
of the annual contract referral volume and 
38% of the PricewaterhouseCoopers referral 
estimate—had been undertaken, at a cost that 
we estimated at just over £1m, 18% of the 
annual contract value. This leaves £1.6m 
of the PricewaterhouseCoopers estimate of 
payments made unaccounted for. We did 
not analyse outpatient activity and neither 
did PricewaterhouseCoopers.
One caveat to our analysis is that NHS 
Tayside’s record for returning SMR01 data 
was among the worst in Scotland, with a 
lower than average accuracy of reporting 
diagnoses.12 13 SMR01 returns from NHS 
Tayside to the Information Services Divi-
sion on 11 August 2008 were estimated to 
be 93% complete for the last quarter of 2007, 
but this level of incompleteness does not 
account for the low treatment numbers we 
found. Additionally, the Scottish Regional 
Treatment Centre may have under-reported 
procedures to the Information Services Divi-
sion; the Healthcare Commission found that 
completeness of data from ISTCs in Eng-
land was poor for the first three years of the 
programme.6
Value for money and risk
The UK government’s claims of value for 
money hinge on the transfer of risks and 
costs from the public to the private sector 
through the contract. The absence of evi-
dence to justify the government’s claims has 
been highlighted elsewhere.4 This contract 
shows that the complex payment mecha-
nism, far from transferring risk to the pri-
vate sector, increases the risks and costs to 
the health boards. First, the contract and 
payment mechanisms require the health 
board to meet the requisite monthly refer-
ral volume—regardless of patients’ needs—
or to meet the costs associated with any 
shortfall, a system known as “take or pay”. 
In this contract Netcare is paid up to 90% 
of the monthly referral value regardless of 
the volume of referrals made. Second, the 
health board pays regardless of whether 
Main points
In England and Scotland the first wave of contracts for independent sector •	
treatment centres (ISTCs) have been drawn up on the basis of referrals 
made by primary care trusts, not actual treatments given.
Our analysis of the only Scottish ISTC contract and a private sector report •	
on value for money shows that the requirements for collecting and 
reporting data, for contracts, and for evaluation do not conform to NHS 
standards.
The Scottish Regional Treatment Centre treated only 32% of annual •	
contract referrals in the first 13 months of operation at 18% of the annual 
contract value. If the same patterns apply in England, up to £927m of 
the £1.5bn may have been paid to ISTCs for patients who did not receive 
treatment under the wave one ISTC contracts.
Contracts should not be renewed and new contracts should not be signed •	
until a proper independent evaluation has been published assessing 
referrals, actual treatments carried out, and payments made for work done 
along with value for money analysis. Full contract details and costs must be 
placed in the public domain for this assessment to take place.
Do the claims made for the Scottish Regional Treatment Centre, opened in 
2007 by former first minister Jack McConnell, live up to scrutiny?
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ISTCs are explicitly allowed to cherry 
pick, selecting the low risk patients. Browne 
and colleagues have shown how case mix in 
ISTCs differs from that in the NHS, making 
any comparisons of costs and quality dif-
ficult.16 Our analysis also shows that ISTCs 
are performing the easier procedures within 
the contract. For example, data from the 
Information Services Division show that 
only 6% of referrals contracted for joint 
replacement and 11% for general surgery 
resulted in actual treatments, compared with 
referrals for minor procedures, which have 
much higher rates of treatment completion 
of over 80%. In either case the effect may 
be serious and destabilising for the NHS 
in terms of both finances and training. 
An NHS study by Clamp and colleagues 
showed a 19% reduction in the number of 
total hip and knee procedures done by jun-
ior doctors in an NHS hospital in Derby 
after the opening of a local ISTC.17
Implications for accountability and  
future policy decisions
The proper and productive use of public 
money is an indispensable element of any 
modern, well managed, and fully account-
able democratic state.18 The evaluation and 
monitoring of a contract between the public 
and the private sector should be relatively 
straightforward—payment given for serv-
ices rendered—but our analysis raises four 
main issues, which are supported by other 
commentators.1 5 6 19 First, lack of access to 
data due to commercial confidence clauses 
means that the contracts, performance, and 
value for money cannot be scrutinised. 
Second, these problems are compounded 
by incompleteness of data collected and 
provided by ISTCs, and by the failure on 
the part of the commercial directorate and 
Department of Health to enforce adequate 
data collection and reporting requirements. 
Third, in this instance the contract and the 
evaluation by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
departed radically from normal reporting 
and costing of work; it is based on refer-
rals made rather than actual treatments 
delivered. This approach raises questions 
about the value for money of the contract 
and about the role and value for money of 
the independent auditors. Fourth, the gov-
ernment’s failure to release the value for 
money methodology in England, combined 
with lack of data, means that the claim that 
ISTCs are good value for money has no 
basis in evidence. The release and analysis 
of the contract in Scotland provides no evi-
dence to support the claim that the Scottish 
centre is efficient or good value for money; 
patients who are referred receive actual 
treatment unless it can prove that the Scot-
tish Regional Treatment Centre failed to 
carry out a treatment. Netcare may have 
been paid up to £3m for patients who did 
not receive treatment.
Contracts based on payment for refer-
rals rather than actual treatments provide 
scope for gaming, undertreatment, and cost 
inflation, not least when the health board is 
penalised for under-referring by volume and 
where lack of data makes external monitor-
ing impossible.
Implications for the English ISTC 
programme
Data availability and data quality
In England the government’s refusal to 
publish contracts is compounded by the 
ISTCs’ failure to provide complete, NHS-
standard data on performance and actual 
work completed. From 32 ISTCs operating 
in January 2008 that returned Hospital Epi-
sodes Statistics data in the second quarter of 
financial year 2007-8, the primary diagnosis 
was missing or invalid for 42.6% of patients, 
compared with 0.1% for NHS operated 
treatment centres; 13.3% had a missing or 
invalid primary procedure code, compared 
with 5.8% in NHS centres; and 64.1% had 
a missing or invalid ethnicity classification, 
compared with 16.8% in NHS centres.5
Basis of payment in the english contracts
In Scotland Netcare is paid monthly on 
the basis of all referrals made by the health 
boards: a marked departure from usual 
standards of commissioning, reporting, and 
paying for activity in the NHS, which under 
the internal market were typically on a cost 
per case or block contract for treatments or 
services. England, like Scotland, bases its 
payment mechanism for wave one ISTC 
contracts on referrals from primary care 
trusts rather than on work actually done. 
The total value of the wave one English 
ISTC contracts is £1.5bn and these con-
tracts are 100% “take or pay” based on con-
tracted referral value.2 3 Phase two contracts 
have been adjusted to reflect payment for 
actual treatment but there is still an unspeci-
fied guaranteed minimum fee payable to the 
ISTCs from the primary care trusts, which 
according to the Department of Health var-
ies between contracts. The Department of 
Health has published data on wave one and 
phase two ISTCs where contract comple-
tion is said to be 85%, but the documenta-
tion does not state whether this figure was 
based on referrals or actual treatments.2 
If the Scottish findings hold true for wave 
one in England then up to £927m of the 
£1.5bn may have been paid to ISTCs for 
patients who did not receive treatment. It is 
important to clarify how the data published 
by the Department of Health are collected, 
recorded, and defined, and whether they 
have been independently validated against 
Hospital Episode Statistics returns.
The Department of Health and NHS 
Information Centre documentation are 
not in accord with each other, but it would 
appear that Netcare has also been awarded 
contracts in wave one of the ISTC pro-
gramme in England for general elective sur-
gery in Manchester (nominal contract value 
£86.1m), a mobile ophthalmology service 
(£41.7m), and possibly as many as five walk 
in centres (value undisclosed). In partner-
ship with the private company InHealth, 
Netcare appears to been awarded phase 
two NHS contracts for diagnostics across 
47 sites in England worth £155.2 m.2 14
ISTC subsidies and training
In addition to the tariff, the independent 
sector treatment centres receive a subsidy 
known as a premium for the first five years 
to cover costs such as bidding costs, but the 
amount received is unclear.4
The NHS is contractually obliged to buy 
back £187m of independent centre facilities 
at the end of the contracts if the providers 
do not wish to continue operating. Some 
of the contracts expire at the beginning of 
2010. Hugh Risebrow, chief executive of 
the private company Interhealth Canada, 
which runs two of the wave one centres, 
said that the independent providers faced 
potential problems refinancing loans to fund 
their facilities; the Department of Health 
may have to step in to support the private 
sector.15
Lack of access to data due to 
commercial confidence clauses 
means that the contracts, 
performance, and value for 
money cannot be scrutinised
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rather, data from the Information Services 
Division suggest that the centre may have 
been paid up to £3m for patients who did 
not receive treatment.
The Healthcare Commission announced 
a review of services at the private for profit 
ISTC in Eccleshill after a coroner’s ver-
dict of death by misadventure aggravated 
by neglect for one patient.20 But its scope 
now needs to be widened: the release and 
publication of all ISTC contracts should be 
mandatory, together with their accounts, 
including expenditure on staffing, admin-
istration, and profits. The centres should 
also be obliged to collect data on patients, 
staff, beds, and quality of care in full com-
pliance with the NHS. Only then can this 
study be replicated in England. Without the 
data, inequalities in distribution of resources 
and access to high quality care can not be 
monitored and parliament cannot account 
for the use of public money. The time has 
come to call a moratorium on ISTC con-
tracts until all the existing contracts have 
been published, and the centres properly 
assessed and investigated.
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PICTUrE QUIz
Recurrent chest infection in a 5 year old boy
1  Dextrocardia, situs inversus, and patchy areas of bronchial wall 
thickening can be seen. The haziness in the right lower zone may 
indicate consolidation. 
2  The diagnosis is primary ciliary dyskinesia.
3  Patients may present with sinusitis, bronchitis, pneumonia, and 
otitis media or with a history of neonatal respiratory distress, 
dextrocardia with situs inversus, or complex congenital heart 
diseases with situs ambiguus. Affected women may present with 
subfertility or ectopic pregnancy, owing to defective ciliary action in 
the fallopian tube; men may be infertile owing to diminished sperm 
motility.
4  Screening tests are measurement of nasal nitric oxide, which is 
consistently low in patients with primary ciliary dyskinesia, and the 
“saccharin test,” which assesses mucociliary function. Diagnosis 
is made through ciliary biopsy. The sample is analysed under light 
microscopy, looking at the frequency and pattern of ciliary beats, and 
the ultrastructure is examined through electron microscopy.
STATISTICAl QUESTIoN: Type I and type II errors
c
CASE rEPorT
A man with high blood pressure
1  Primary “essential” hypertension or “white coat hypertension” 
(high in surgery but normal at home).
2  Secondary hypertension caused by drug misuse, 
phaeochromocytoma, primary aldosteronism, renal failure, renal 
artery stenosis, or coarctation of the aorta.
3  Take a history to exclude drug and alcohol misuse as causes. Ask 
him about symptoms of palpitations or sweating. Measure urea, 
electrolytes, lipids, and random blood glucose. Carry out a full 
blood count, liver function tests, urinalysis, ambulatory blood 
pressure monitoring, and resting electrocardiography. If his 
high blood pressure is sustained on ambulatory blood pressure 
monitoring, measure urinary metanephrines and perform renal 
ultrasonography.
4  The diagnosis was white coat hypertension. His average 
awake time ambulatory blood pressure was 132/78 mm Hg. He 
was reassured, but advised to have annual ambulatory blood 
pressure monitoring.
ANSwERS To ENDGAMES, p 1151
For long answers use advanced search at bmj.com and  
enter question details
